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MENTAL MODELS, MAGICAL THINKING, 
AND INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract: Broadly, there are two mutually exclusive accounts of how people (non-
specialist users) reason about and conceptualize interactive technology. The first is 
based on classical cognitive psychology and is characterized by the term mental model. 
The second, drawing on concepts from social cognition, observes that people often 
anthropomorphize technology. We argue that people are able to exhibit both of these 
quite different styles of cognition, which Baron-Cohen has described as systemizing and 
empathizing. The former is associated with the drive to analyze, explore, and construct a 
system, whereas the latter is the ability to spontaneously tune into another’s thoughts 
and feelings. The propensity to systemize might give rise to a mental model, while the 
empathizing tendency might tend to anthropomorphize technology. We present an 
empirical study that lends support for the above position. 
 
Keywords: human–computer interaction, cognitive style, mental model, 
anthropomorphization. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Interactive technology is one of the defining characteristics of modern society, and how we 
design, use, and think about it is, consequently, of considerable importance. To this end 
human–computer interaction (HCI) is a multidisciplinary field that has drawn on psychology, 
software engineering, anthropology, sociology, and philosophy. Indeed, in the preface of the 
first great HCI text, The Psychology of Human-Computer Interaction (Card, Moran, & 
Newell, 1983), we find, “The domain of concern to us, and the subject of this book, is how 
humans interact with computers. A scientific psychology should help us in arranging the 
interface so it is easy, efficient and error free” (p. vii). Recalling the early days of HCI, 
Carroll (2003, p. 3) observes that, “the initial vision of HCI as an applied science was to bring 
cognitive-science methods and theories to bear on software development.” In due course, 
Card and his colleagues went on to propose the model human processor (as a means of modeling 
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how people reason about and use technology) and to create an essentially task-based 
approach to the design of the user interface. This dual use of cognition has remained with us 
to this day.  
Some 20 years later, HCI has successfully developed numerous cognitive models and 
psychologically plausible engineering models of human behavior (Gardiner & Christie, 1987; 
Hollnagel & Woods, 1983; Payne, 1991) that, to a greater or lesser extent, have proved to be 
able to model aspects of the behavior of people using interactive systems and devices. 
Strongly predictive models, such as the keystroke-level model (Card, Moran, & Newell, 
1980), have, for example, been used to predict the time to complete a task for a skilled 
individual, while cognitively inspired tools like GOMS (goals, operators, methods and 
selection) have been used in the design and evaluation of user interfaces (John & Kieras, 
1996). This “golden age of HCI” (Carroll, 2003) has also witnessed the adoption of mental 
models as a means of accounting for how we learn to use and conceptualize interactive 
technology (e.g., Gentner & Stevens, 1983; Norman, 1983). The term mental model first 
appeared in Craik’s The Nature of Explanation (1943) and then reappeared in the 1980s, as 
Johnson-Laird (1983) and Gentner and Stevens (1983) independently adopted the term to 
describe complex cognitive representations. These models are very diverse and include 
systems (e.g., our knowledge of banking), devices (e.g., the operation of pocket calculators), 
physical forces (e.g., the nature of electricity), or a concept (e.g., the administration of 
justice). HCI mental models also have had the dual role of being used to reason about how to 
create an interactive system and as a means to represent people’s understanding of a 
particular interactive device or system (e.g., Norman, 1983).  
While subsequent research has moved beyond this exclusively cognitive stance (discussed 
below), there remains the assumption that cognition (mental models in particular) still has a 
role in how people use interactive technology. However a recent report in New Scientist 
magazine (Marks, 2008) reminds us of another aspect of our cognition that manifests as a 
tendency to treat inanimate objects like pets or even friends. The magazine cites a report of 
people’s interactions with Roomba, a robot vacuum cleaner.1 It was reported that some of the 
owners of this vacuum cleaner dressed it up, assigned it a gender and even gave it a name. It is 
suggested that this kind of behavior is commonplace. Indeed, a decade or so earlier, Reeves and 
Nass (1996) presented evidence that users treat computers, television, and other new media as 
though they were people, that is, response to or interaction with them is primarily social. We 
are, for example, polite (and rude) to interactive technology and these responses, they suggest, 
are the products of our “old brains” being misled amid the glamour of these new media. They 
also argue that media representations and techniques have been progressively designed over 
time specifically to activate these very social responses. For the purposes of this discussion, and 
in keeping with more recent research, we will characterize these descriptions as 
anthropomorphic accounts that arise from aspects of our social cognition. 
So it appears we are potentially faced with a dichotomy. Either people conceptualize 
interactive technology by way of a mental model, which is characterized as set of processes 
that can be modeled, or as a friend—“superstitious” in character and comprising “magical 
thinking”—that is, ascribing agency, feelings, and intentions to technology. However, it 
could be both. Our treatment of this mismatch is to recognize that these two views reflect two 
distinct cognitive styles that appear to correspond with the distinction Baron-Cohen (1995, 
2002, 2004) has named systemizing and empathizing cognition. Systemizing cognition is 
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associated with the drive to analyze, explore, and construct a system and, as such, is a 
candidate for the mechanism (or mechanisms) responsible for creating a mental model. 
Empathizing cognition, in contrast, is the ability to spontaneously tune into another’s 
thoughts and feelings. Empathizing cognition is closely related to what has been called theory 
of mind (Premack & Woodruff, 1978) and may be the source of our tendency to treat 
technologies as though they have thoughts, feelings, moods, and desires of their own. Baron-
Cohen also has shown that this is not an either-or situation, but rather individuals having both 
abilities in different proportions. This observation may allow us to account for people being 
able to hold both positions with respect to interactive technology. 
 
 
COGNITIVE ACCOUNTS, RATIONALISTIC APPROACHES 
 
Most of the work on mental models was conducted in the 1980s and 1990s, but began to lose 
favor when a raft of new concepts in human–computer interaction appeared. Cognition itself 
is now recognized as being situated (e.g., Suchman, 1987), distributed (e.g., Hutchins, 1995; 
Hollan, Hutchins, & Kirsh, 2000), external (e.g., Scaife & Rogers, 1996), embodied (e.g., 
Clark, 1997; van Dijk, 2009, this volume; Valera, Thompson, & Rosch 1991), and even 
collective (e.g., Engeström, 1987, 1999). Although classical cognition, as typified by Fodor 
(1983), no longer has as much currency as it once had, it has proven to be remarkably 
resilient, as the work we have just cited are extensions to cognition, not evidence of its 
abandonment. As for mental models themselves, Gillian Crampton Smith, the doyenne of 
interaction design, notes the importance of a good mental model in the design of interactive 
technology, in that, “we need a clear mental model of what we’re interacting with” 
(Crampton Smith, n.d., cited in Moggridge, 2007, p. xv). 
As we have already noted, mental model accounts have been used both to inform design 
and as an explanatory medium, though this has not always been made explicit. A 
consequence of this, although there are other contributory factors, is that there is no 
agreement on the precise nature, function, or composition of mental models. Indeed Rouse 
and Morris (1986, p. 360) have noted,  
At present, this area of study is rife with terminological inconsistencies and a 
preponderance of conjectures rather than data. This situation arises, to a great extent, 
because a variety of sub-disciplines have adopted the concept of mental models, and 
proceeded to develop their own terminology and methodology, independent of past or 
current work in this area in other sub-disciplines.  
 
Mental Models as the Basis of the Design of Interactive Technology 
 
From the design perspective, Norman (1983) introduced a number of different forms of 
mental model. The first is the user-constructed model of the computer system (the target 
system) with which he/she is interacting. The target system should be designed in such a way 
as to communicate its underlying conceptual model. Later he revised this account (Norman, 
1986) so that the target system becomes the system image that includes the physical model of 
the system: input/output devices, documentation, training, error handling, and so forth. The 
conceptual model becomes the design model created by the designer, and the user’s model is 
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now the result of interaction with the system image. Thus, good design is embodied and 
determined by the quality of the mapping between the system image and the resultant user’s 
mental model. If the system image is not a clear reflection of the design model, then the user 
will end up with the wrong mental model. 
 
Mental Models as the Basis of How We Reason about Interactive Technology  
 
From the explanatory perspective, Young (1981, 1983), for example, explored a number of 
the properties of mental models through a series of empirical investigations. His studies 
investigated how people reasoned about the use of calculators. Of particular interest to 
Young were the role of analogy, the stability of mental models in long term memory, their 
propositional content, and the rules governing the operation (i.e., their “grammar”). 
Norman (1983, 1986) also concluded that (a) mental models are incomplete and unstable, 
since people forget details of the system; (b) people’s abilities to “run” their models (in the 
sense of running an internal simulation) are severely limited and do not have firm 
boundaries; that is, similar devices and operations get confused with one another; (c) 
mental models are unscientific; and (d) mental models are parsimonious. People are willing 
to undertake additional physical operations to minimize mental effort; for example, people 
will switch off the device to reboot and start again rather than trying to recover from an 
error. Finally, Payne (1991) reported what he called a descriptive study of mental models. 
He recruited 16 participants who were interviewed about their beliefs and understanding of 
the mechanisms behind ATMs (automated cash dispensers). He was specifically interested 
in (and whether) people spontaneously create explanatory mental models about the ATM’s 
operation. Following an informal content analysis of the resulting interviews, Payne 
observed that “it is clear that many subjects had already constructed mental models of bank 
machines—they had speculated about the inner working of the system in advance of being 
promoted to do so by a curious psychologist” (1991, p. 18). In all, he concluded that mental 
models can be used to predict behavior by means of “mental simulation,” which in turn rely 
on analogy to function.  
Despite the weaknesses of the mental model accounts of how people think about the 
operation of interactive technology, it is worth reiterating that no other widely held explanation 
has yet appeared to directly replace it, except, of course, when people think of interactive 
technology as their friends. 
 
 
ANTHROPOMORPHIC ACCOUNTS 
 
The ascription of human-like characteristics to computing technology has become 
integral to our design, use, training, and communications with regard to computing 
technology and it has been argued to be the most common metaphor used in computing 
discourse. (Johnson, Marakas, & Palmer, 2008, p. 169) 
 
Reeves and Nass (1996) were among the first to recognize that the way in which we treat 
interactive technology, television, and other new media is essentially social. In their The Media 
Equation, they show in a surprisingly wide variety of ways that the apparent blurring of real and 
mediated life is commonplace. They present evidence that we interact with media in the same 
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way we respond to other people, using the same rules that govern face-to-face interpersonal 
interactions. This equation is recognized as being particularly remarkable and counterintuitive, 
since people know that the medium they are interacting with is not a real person.  
Interactive technology is, of course, distinguished from other technologies by virtue of its 
very interactivity, a trait it shares with humans. Computers also use language. Computers are 
instructed to perform by way of programming languages. HCI designers are concerned with 
dialogue design, that is, how the interaction between person and interactive technology is 
structured. Computers can produce human-sounding voices (Nass & Moon, 2000; indeed it 
has been noted by many that the only really human character in Stanley Kubrick’s 1968 
movie 2001: A Space Odyssey, was HAL, the computer). Studies of social presence have 
revealed that users easily and regularly ascribe human characteristics, emotion, and behavior 
to avatars created within collaborative virtual environments (for a review, see Biocca, Harms, 
& Burgoon, 2003.) Perhaps most importantly, computers now fill roles traditionally held by 
humans. Computing technology is ubiquitous in our society, often mediating our basic daily 
interactions, such as communication, banking, paying bills and taxes, and governing much of 
our working lives. Winograd and Flores (1987) also have observed that computing 
technology has apparent autonomy, complexity of purpose, structural plasticity, and 
unpredictability—all of which are human-like characteristics.  
Nass and Moon (2000, p. 86) have examined what they describe as the fundamental 
truth that “the computer is not a person and does not warrant human treatment or 
attribution.” They point out that computers do not have faces or bodies—unlike, say, a 
child’s toy—are unresponsive to human affect, and never express emotion themselves. Yet 
for all of this, there is abundant evidence that people mindlessly apply social rules and 
expectations to interactive media. In a series of experiments, they further found that people 
tend to “overuse human social categories” (p. 82), such as gender and ethnicity, politeness 
and reciprocity, and behave as though computers have personality traits, such as 
friendliness. People also have been found to use social rules and respond to computers with 
different voices (Nass & Steuer 1993), to feel psychologically close to or connected with a 
computer (Lee & Nass, 2005), to respond to computer personalities in a similar manner as 
they respond to human personalities (e.g., Brave, Nass, & Hutchinson, 2005), and even to 
respond to flattery from the computer (Fogg & Nass, 1997). Evidence shows that people 
with strong anthropomorphic beliefs are more likely to ascribe responsibility for their 
interactions with and outputs of a decision support system than those with weaker 
anthropomorphic beliefs, even though the ultimate interactions and decisions were within 
the control of all users (Johnson, Marakas, & Palmer, 2006). In all, there are fewer studies 
of this kind than the corresponding classical cognitive accounts and their findings are yet to 
be translated into design features. Nonetheless, their results are very robust. Next we 
consider these two different cognitive styles. 
 
 
DIFFERENT COGNITIVE STYLES 
 
Baron-Cohen’s (1995, 2002, 2004) systemizing–empathizing account of psychological sex 
differences is based on neurological differences in “male” and “female” brains. While Baron-
Cohen emphasizes functional and structural brain difference, we, like others (e.g., Focquaert, 
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Steven, Wolford, Colden, & Gazzaniga, 2007), are more concerned with the differences in 
the resulting cognitive style and their consequences for how people think about interactive 
technology. We approach this concept with some caution since we believe that this is first 
time Baron-Cohen’s work has been applied to the domain of HCI. 
Baron-Cohen claims that the female brain has a predominant propensity for empathy 
while the male brain is predominantly wired for understanding and building systems. In 
support of this position, he introduces evidence to suggest that male and female brains 
develop differently from conception. The source of these differences is the presence of 
prenatal androgens (male sex hormones) that can permanently affect the development of the 
neural structure and function of the brain. However, while male brains are more commonly 
found in men and female brains in women, this distinction is in no sense absolute. The 
propensity to analyze a system in terms of the rules that govern it in order to predict its 
behavior and the propensity to identify and understand the mental states of the other in order 
to predict his/her behavior, and to respond appropriately in either case, is found in both men 
and women (Baron-Cohen, 1995, 2002, 2004; Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004). 
Excepting a few extreme examples, no one would suggest that men are incapable of empathy, 
nor women incapable of understanding the workings of a system. Every individual has a 
propensity for each cognitive style in varying proportions.  
Individual systemizing and empathizing quotients can be derived means of a pair of 
administered questionnaires that Baron-Cohen (2004) has developed (see Appendixes A 
and B). These questionnaires consist of 60 questions for either a Systemizing Quotient (SQ) 
or an Empathy Quotient (EQ), and are based on a Likert scale, with answers ranging from 
strongly agree to strongly disagree. The questions related to the SQ are of the form, “When 
I listen to a piece of music, I always notice the way it’s structured” and “If I were buying a 
car, I would want to obtain specific information about its engine capacity,” which are 
designed to capture a person’s tendency to systematize. By contrast, the EQ questions are 
of the form, “I can easily tell if someone else wants to enter a conversation” and “I find it 
difficult to explain to others things that I understand easily, when they don’t understand it 
first time” [sic]. Questions are scored 1 or 2 points on the respective scales, although there 
are also some null questions that afford no score. From the resultant scores, people can be 
categorized as high, average, or low empathizers or systemizers, remembering that the two 
scales are independent. These quotients can be interpreted using the guidelines, which may 
be found Table 1.  
 
 
HOW PEOPLE THINK ABOUT THEIR MOBILE PHONES 
 
Before describing the procedure we adopted, it is worth taking a moment to examine the 
methodology that inspired this work. It will be recalled (see Section 2) that Payne (1991) 
conducted a series of interviews with the intention of exploring the mental models people 
spontaneously create to mediate their interaction with technology. In his study, he 
interviewed people regarding their attitudes and understanding of ATMs. The interviews 
were conducted in an unrestrained manner. Payne’s subsequent treatment of the data is not 
well documented but appears to be an informal content analysis. 
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Table 1.  Interpreting the EQ and SQ Results (after Baron-Cohen, 2004, p. 216). 
Empathizing Quotient (EQ) 
i.e., the ability to understand how other people feel and responding appropriately 
0-32 Lower than average  
33-52 Average ability  
53-63 Above average  
64-80 Very high ability  
Systemizing Quotient (SQ) 
i.e., the ability to analyze and explore a system 
0-19 Lower than average  
20-39 Average ability  
40-50 Above average ability 
51-80 Very high ability (three times as many people with Asperger syndrome
2
 score in 
this range compared to typical men, and almost no women score in this range) 
Note: In the EQ scoring, most women score about 47 and most men score about 42, while in the SQ scoring, 
most women score about 24 and most men score about 30. 
 
Research Questions 
 
Modern mobile phones are no longer limited to simply making and receiving calls; they now 
routinely have a range of interactive functions and, as such, can be treated as interactive 
technology. Therefore, we propose that the SQ and EQ of the individuals in this study are 
indicative of their propensity to describe the operation of interactive technology (i.e., mobile 
phones in this instance) using language that is  
  rich in technical, systemizing terms (for those with above average SQs), or 
  filled with anthropocentric, empathizing terms (for those with above average EQs), or 
  a mixture of technical and anthropocentric language (for those balanced in their SQ 
and EQ). 
Although we have not proposed formal hypotheses for this study, it is worth considering the 
null, or alternate, hypothesis before proceeding to a discussion of the method. We have been 
careful to stress that while our research questions (described above) are indicative, myriad other 
factors may well mask these systemizing and empathizing propensities. While a formal 
experimental protocol may have been able to isolate and control for these factors, our interest 
was in (a) reproducing Payne’s explicitly descriptive study, and (b) exploring the everyday, 
rather than the experimental, aspects of people using their mobile phones.  
 
Method 
 
Participants 
 
In all, 16 males and 7 females agreed to participate. All were non-immigrant native English 
speakers. They were aged between 18 and 45 years, with median age of 22 years. These 
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people had been recruited from the postgraduate research students and undergraduates from 
the School of Computing at the Edinburgh Napier University.  
 
Procedure  
 
All 23 participants first completed the two questionnaires that measured their individual EQ 
and SQ. These were scored by the second author using the guidelines that accompany them. 
Of the 23 participants, 13 achieved balanced score (EQ = SQ, which we operationally define 
as EQ = SQ ±5), 4 achieved an above average score in empathy abilities (EQ>SQ) and 6 
people scored above average systemizing abilities (SQ>EQ). On the basis of these results, 12 
people (4 above average EQs, 4 above average SQs, and 4 balanced3) were randomly selected 
to participate in the interview portion of the study. 
The selected participants were individually taken aside to a quiet room to be interviewed. 
The participants were asked to complete a consent form and were informed that the collected 
data would be transcribed, analyzed, and may be submitted for publication. The participants 
were assured that this was not a test of their knowledge, and they were not obliged to provide 
the interviewer with an answer. An audio recording, using a Sony DAT recorder, was made 
of the interviews. The interviews themselves varied in length from around 10 to almost 40 
minutes (varying with the loquaciousness of the interviewee). The interview procedure was 
designed to constrain the interviewee as little as possible, although some limited prompts 
were necessary. All were also asked to demonstrate and talk-through the typical use of their 
mobile phones. Participants were encouraged to discuss how they used mobile phones and the 
role of this technology in their lives. A full list of questions asked of every participant can be 
found in Appendix C. 
As in much qualitative research, content analysis is fundamentally interpretive, meaning 
is often implicit and can only be understood through deep and repeated familiarity with the 
entirety of each participant’s interview protocol. What follows are both illustrative and 
representative of the participants’ answers to two of the questions we posed. The quotations 
were selected by the authors to reflect the participants’ cognitive style, that is, whether they 
tended to systemize, empathize, or give balanced answers.  
 
 
RESULTS 
 
The question “What is inside a mobile phone?” was so phrased to more likely prompt a 
technical answer. We expected that those individuals with relatively high SQs would offer 
detailed technical answers. 
 
Above Average SQs (40–50) 
 
Of six participants with high SQs, all but one provided highly technical answers; the other 
gave answers using systematizing language, although it was considerably less technical.  
What’s in the telephone? Ummh--lots of transistors and chips and things, and the 
battery, [pause] and [pause] liquid crystal display for the screen and the speaker, and the 
microphone, and the camera [pause]. (Participant 1, SQ = 40) 
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Many things, circuit boards, chips, transceiver [laughs], battery [pause], a camera in 
some of them, a media player, buttons, lots of different things. [pause] Well there are lots 
and lots of different bits and pieces to the phone, there are mainly in ... Eh, like inside the 
chip there are lots of little transistors, which is used, they build up to lots of different 
types of gates and/or “x” these types of gates or electronic gates. There are resisters and 
diodes; [pause] there’s a fair amount of copper on, I’d imagine, on circuit boards. There 
are lights, some of which are light-emitting diodes; in fact they are all probably light 
emitting diodes. There’s a camera, as I have already said. There’s a battery, and in most 
modern mobile phones they use lithium polymer batteries, um… because they last longer 
and have greater capacity…. (Participant 4, SQ = 44) 
What is in the phone? Um, all kinds of circuitry and devices. I know there’s a camera in 
the phone, so there will be a light detector for that. And there is a wireless card, so 
there’s a wireless interface for that. There’s a memory slot, so there will be an interface 
for that. There’s a SIM card; the SIM card contains your personal information, it’s a sort 
of chip that contains your unique identifier for the network, so basically your phone 
number and such. Uh, it has onboard memory for storage; it has onboard memory, 
volatile memory for operating system use, umm, and it has the various hardware that 
drives the screen. (Participant 6, SQ = 45) 
In... inside the telephone? Well, I mean it’s ... eh ... you know, you're going to have a 
printed circuit board, known as a PCB. Ahh ... that ... that allows for communications 
between the different, ah ... chips on the PCB for things like voice encoding and 
decoding, umm... so I can hear and speak ahh ... with people. Umm ... This also allows 
for power to come from the battery to the different elements, umm ... and obviously to the 
screen as well. (Participant 7, SQ = 50) 
 
Average SQs (20–39) 
 
Participants with average SQ scores tended to be less loquacious, saying less about what is 
inside their phones than those with higher scores.  
What's in it? It's a little computer; it's a microchip, and a screen, and shit like that. 
(Participant 8, SQ = 24) 
No. [laughs] A speaker and a microphone and a camera, if you got a camera [laughs], 
phone umm ... and a battery and a SIM card. That's about all I know. (Participant 10, 
SQ = 27) 
There were no participants with low SQs in the sample with whom we could compare 
accounts. 
 
How People Think Mobile Phones Work 
 
Following Payne’s protocol, we asked, “How do you think the telephone works?” with the coda, 
“Pretend you are answering to the intelligent Martian who has no experience with the devices.” 
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Balanced Individuals (EQ = SQ ±5) 
 
All participants with balanced EQ and SQ scores tended to give answers that contained strong 
evidence of neither systemizing nor empathizing elements. 
Ok [long pause] Umm... Ok... I... I... I...think like, Mmmh ... of course it's working over 
satellite and, mmmh ... it's provided with software for the text messages, like that I can 
use T9 and stuff like that. And I think it's almost just based on software and this, umm … 
code is transferred over satellite. [pause] And the, the, the calling is just like with a 
normal phone but it's not transferred over a landline but over umm satellite, that’s… 
yeah. (Participant 11, SQ = 33, EQ = 38) 
Participant 11, unlike those scoring above average on the systemizing scale, shows little or 
no evidence of having a detailed mental model of the phone’s operation. Instead she describes 
the operation of a mobile phone coherently but in a high level, fairly general manner. 
 
Above Average EQ (55–63) 
 
All highly empathizing participants provided similar sorts of answers to the same question 
that tended to highlight the surface features of their phones. 
It flashes the lights, screen flashes, and the buttons lights up, and it vibrates. It comes to 
life on the inside and it comes to life on the outside, and you talk to the one side and 
someone is answering on the other side [long pause]. Umm... well, all the different 
elements connect and work in the phone so enable you to … make the phone call. I don't 
know how, but yeah ... I don't know. It’s a mystery. It’s magical [laughs]. I have no 
understanding of how it works. So it really is magical. (Participant 3, EQ = 55) 
[Interviewer] What happens if you enter your PIN code incorrectly? 
Three times? It locks me out. 
[interviewer] And what does it mean? 
It means I can't use it and I cry quite a lot. (Participant 8, EQ = 56) 
For Participant 3, who shows above average empathizing propensity, the language is 
quite different from that of the other extracts. This participant ascribed agency to her phone 
(“It comes to life”) and often referred to her phone as being magical. 
Space prevents a fuller account of these interviews but what is clear is that there is a 
relationship (but not a simple one) between the systemizing quotients and the nature of the 
answers people gave. People with high SQs appear to have complex, well populated mental 
models of their phones; people with lower SQs less so. For those with high EQs, the picture is less 
clear. There is some evidence of anthropomorphism, but we suspect the demand characteristics of 
the situation may have obscured this. The balanced individuals are best characterized as being 
disinterested, with no real evidence of either systemizing or empathizing propensities. 
 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
As we have seen, there is a considerable body of evidence regarding how people reason about 
and conceptualize everyday interactive technology. We have argued that Baron-Cohen’s 
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(1995, 2002, 2004) distinction between systemizing and empathizing cognition is used here 
differentially to create either mental model or anthropomorphic descriptions, as required. The 
data we have presented from the study of how people think about their mobile phones 
indicate that 
 people who demonstrate high SQs tend to produce detailed, technical accounts of 
technology. This finding is consistent with the mental models hypothesis.  
 people who demonstrate high EQs correspondingly show little technical knowledge 
and are given to describing the workings of technology in terms of magic and 
anthropocentricism. 
 people who demonstrate a balanced EQ and SQ appear to offer explanations on 
how technology works that are neither overly technical nor anthropomorphic.  
However a powerful factor in an experimental setting such as this is the way in which we 
posed the questions. Cognition cannot be observed directly, but the very ways in which we study 
it necessarily affect the results. Orne (1962) and Orne and Whitehouse (2000) have identified 
what they describe as demand characteristics that can be encountered in psychological studies. 
They found that people, understandably, attempt to make sense of what the experimenter is 
trying to achieve. So as soon as we ask questions about how people think about something, we 
are (a) necessarily asking biased questions, and (b) effectively prompting them to answer in a 
particular way. Demand characteristics, more formally, refer to the totality of cues and role 
expectations that are inhered within all social contexts, including a study such as this. The 
consequences or effect of demand characteristics in this situation will vary with the extent to 
which they are perceived, as well as with the motivation and ability of the person to comply. 
Demand characteristics are very difficult to control for and, in asking people about the operation 
of mobile phones, we can recognize that some questions will tend to elicit or prompt a technical 
answer while other questions will tend to prompt more discursive nontechnical answers. This 
then is consistent with Norman’s (1993) and Clancey’s (1997) observations concerning situated 
cognition. As Norman (1993, p. 4) observes, situated cognition places an emphasis on  
the structures of the world and how they constrain and guide behavior…. Human 
knowledge and interaction cannot be divorced from the world. To do so is to study a 
disembodied intelligence, one that is artificial, unreal, and uncharacteristic of actual 
behavior. What really matters is the situation and the parts that people play. One cannot 
look at just the situation, or just the environment, or just the person. To do so is to 
destroy the very phenomenon of interest. After all, it is the mutual accommodation of 
people and the environment that matters, so to focus upon only aspects in isolation is to 
destroy the interaction, to eliminate the role of the situation upon cognition and action.  
Therefore, we must be aware that all of the responses we received were, in part, a function 
of the demand characteristics of the study condition; in short, technical questions elicit 
technical replies and everyday questions elicit everyday answers. Given this, we conclude that 
the explanations people gave as to how technology works was a function of their ability to 
adopt the appropriate cognitive style and to manage the situation demanding this cognition. So 
how people think about interactive technology may be thought of as an interaction between 
their cognitive propensities and the situation in which their cognition is exercised.  
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FURTHER WORK 
 
So what are the practical applications of these findings? While it is difficult to imagine how 
cognitive style might be used to guide the design of, say, custom-made interactive technology 
(e.g., a mobile phone for above-average empathizers, although its usefulness in marketing is 
quite clear), it may have consequences for the evaluation of interactive technology. 
Evaluation is the cornerstone of HCI; it lies at the heart of the user-centered approach to 
the development of interactive systems (e.g., the star lifecycle model; Hartson & Hix, 1993). 
It is the means by which the user experience of the system is fed back to the designer; it is the 
obverse of design. Many different evaluation techniques are available to the HCI practitioner, 
but they can be reasonably categorized into four basic themes: 
1. Expert evaluation is characterized by the absence of the intended end user of the 
system but the presence of an expert (e.g., Smith & Mosier, 1986). The expert makes 
judgments about the design of the interactive technology against a set of guidelines.  
2. Model-based evaluation is based on predictions about user behavior made using a 
psychologically plausible or ergonomic model (e.g., Card et al., 1980; John & 
Kieras, 1996). 
3. Scenario-based, task-based, and cooperative forms of evaluation involve one or more 
representative users. A typical scenario or task is created with the users working 
through it, during which problems are identified (e.g., Carey & Rusli, 1995).  
4. Finally, there are evaluation techniques that simulate the presence or behavior of a 
user, such as the cognitive walkthrough (e.g., Poulson, Bovair, & Kieras, 1982; 
Spencer, 2000). 
It is important not to overstate any criticism of these approaches, as they have 
significantly contributed to the creation of very many usable systems. However all four styles 
of evaluation treat users like experimental subjects, just as in the classic psychological 
experiments that (a) sought to make statements about the general population, rather than 
individuals; and (b) tested hypotheses of the form, interface/artifact A is “better” than 
interface/artifact B. In all, there typically is no treatment of individual differences beyond a 
gross categorization, such as novice and expert, or frequent and infrequent users. It may be 
that this fairly simple systemizer–empathizer–balanced categorization may prove to be both a 
useful and, just as importantly, a practical means of saying something about individual 
differences in the experience of end users of a given interactive technology.  
 
 
ENDNOTES 
 
1. See http://store.irobot.com for more information.  
2. Baron-Cohen (2004, pp. 135–136) describes Asperger syndrome (AS) as a variant of autism. He writes, “A 
child with AS has the same difficulties in social and communication skills and has the same obsessional 
interests. However, such children not only have normal or high IQ (unlike those with high-functioning autism) 
but they also start speaking on time. 
3. Balanced scores can be so at all three levels of SQ and EQ: high, medium, and low. 
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APPENDIX A: THE EQ QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
The Empathy Quotient is intended to measure how easily you pick up on other people’s 
feelings and how strongly you are affected by other people’s feelings. Please read each of the 
60 following statements very carefully and rate how strongly you agree or disagree with them 
by circling your answer. There are no right or wrong answers, or trick questions.  
 
1. I can easily tell if someone else wants 
to enter a conversation.  
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
2. I prefer animals to humans.  strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
3. I try to keep up with the current trends 
and fashions.  
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
4. I find it difficult to explain to others 
things that I understand easily, when 
they don't understand it first time.  
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
5. I dream most nights.  strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
6. I really enjoy caring for other people.  strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
7. I try to solve my own problems rather 
than discussing them with others.  
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
8. I find it hard to know what to do in a 
social situation.  
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
9. I am at my best first thing in the 
morning.  
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
10. People often tell me that I went too far 
in driving my point home in a 
discussion.  
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
11. It doesn't bother me too much if I am 
late meeting a friend.  
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
12. Friendships and relationships are just 
too difficult, so I tend not to bother with 
them.  
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
13. I would never break a law, no matter 
how minor.  
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
14. I often find it difficult to judge if 
something is rude or polite.  
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
15. In a conversation, I tend to focus on 
my own thoughts rather than on what 
my listener might be thinking.  
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
16. I prefer practical jokes to verbal 
humour.  
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
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17. I live life for today rather than the 
future.  
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
18. When I was a child, I enjoyed cutting 
up worms to see what would happen.  
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
19. I can pick up quickly if someone says 
one thing but means another.  
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
20. I tend to have very strong opinions 
about morality.  
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
21. It is hard for me to see why some 
things upset people so much.  
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
22. I find it easy to put myself in somebody 
else's shoes.  
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
23. I think that good manners are the most 
important thing a parent can teach 
their child.  
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
24. I like to do things on the spur of the 
moment.  
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
25. I am good at predicting how someone 
will feel.  
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
26. I am quick to spot when someone in a 
group is feeling awkward or 
uncomfortable.  
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
27. If I say something that someone else 
is offended by, I think that that's their 
problem, not mine.  
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
28. If anyone asked me if I liked their 
haircut, I would reply truthfully, even if 
I didn't like it.  
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
29. I can't always see why someone 
should have felt offended by a remark.  
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
30. People often tell me that I am very 
unpredictable.  
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
31. I enjoy being the centre of attention at 
any social gathering.  
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
32. Seeing people cry doesn't really upset 
me.  
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
33. I enjoy having discussions about 
politics.  
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
34. I am very blunt, which some people 
take to be rudeness, even though this 
is unintentional.  
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
35. I don’t tend to find social situations 
confusing.  
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
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36. Other people tell me I am good at 
understanding how they are feeling 
and what they are thinking.  
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
37. When I talk to people, I tend to talk 
about their experiences rather than my 
own.  
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
38. It upsets me to see an animal in pain.  strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
39. I am able to make decisions without 
being influenced by people's feelings.  
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
40. I can't relax until I have done everything 
I had planned to do that day.  
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
41. I can easily tell if someone else is 
interested or bored with what I am 
saying.  
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
42. I get upset if I see people suffering on 
news programmes.  
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
43. Friends usually talk to me about their 
problems as they say that I am very 
understanding.  
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
44. I can sense if I am intruding, even if 
the other person doesn't tell me.  
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
45. I often start new hobbies but quickly 
become bored with them and move on 
to something else.  
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
46. People sometimes tell me that I have 
gone too far with teasing.  
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
47. I would be too nervous to go on a big 
rollercoaster.  
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
48. Other people often say that I am 
insensitive, though I don’t always see 
why.  
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
49. If I see a stranger in a group, I think 
that it is up to them to make an effort 
to join in.  
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
50. I usually stay emotionally detached 
when watching a film.  
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
51. I like to be very organised in day to 
day life and often make lists of the 
chores I have to do.  
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
52. I can tune into how someone else 
feels rapidly and intuitively.  
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
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53. I don't like to take risks.  strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
54. I can easily work out what another 
person might want to talk about.  
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
55. I can tell if someone is masking their 
true emotion.  
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
56. Before making a decision I always 
weigh up the pros and cons.  
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
57. I don't consciously work out the rules 
of social situations.  
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
58. I am good at predicting what someone 
will do.  
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
59. I tend to get emotionally involved with 
a friend's problems. 
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
60. I can usually appreciate the other 
person's viewpoint, even if I don't 
agree with it. 
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
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APPENDIX B: THE SQ QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
The Systemizing Quotient gives a score based on how interested you assess yourself to be in 
each of the following forms of systemizing. Systemizing is the drive to analyse and explore a 
system, to extract underlying rules that govern the behaviour of a system; and the drive to 
construct systems. Please read each of the following 60 statements very carefully and rate 
how strongly you agree or disagree with them by circling your answer. There are no right or 
wrong answers, or trick questions. 
 
1. When I listen to a piece of music, I 
always notice the way it's structured.  
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
2. I adhere to common superstitions.  strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
3. I often make resolutions, but find it hard 
to stick to them.  
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
4. I prefer to read non-fiction than fiction.  strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
5. If I were buying a car, I would want to 
obtain specific information about its 
engine capacity.  
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
6. When I look at a painting, I do not 
usually think about the technique 
involved in making it.  
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
7. If there was a problem with the 
electrical wiring in my home, I'd be able 
to fix it myself.  
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
8. When I have a dream, I find it difficult 
to remember precise details about the 
dream the next day.  
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
9. When I watch a film, I prefer to be with 
a group of friends, rather than alone.  
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
10. I am interested in learning about 
different religions.  
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
11. I rarely read articles or webpages 
about new technology.  
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
12. I do not enjoy games that involve a 
high degree of strategy.  
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
13.  I am fascinated by how machines 
work.  
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
14. I make it a point of listening to the news 
each morning.  
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
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15. In maths, I am intrigued by the rules 
and patterns governing numbers.  
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
16. I am bad about keeping in touch with 
old friends.  
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
17. When I am relating a story, I often 
leave out details and just give the gist 
of what happened.  
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
18. I find it difficult to understand instruction 
manuals for putting appliances together.  
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
19. When I look at an animal, I like to know 
the precise species it belongs to.  
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
20.  If I were buying a computer, I would 
want to know exact details about its 
hard drive capacity and processor 
speed.  
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
21.  I enjoy participating in sport.  strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
22.  I try to avoid doing household chores if 
I can.  
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
23.  When I cook, I do not think about 
exactly how different methods and 
ingredients contribute to the final 
product.  
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
24.  I find it difficult to read and understand 
maps.  
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
25.  If I had a collection (e.g. CDs, coins, 
stamps), it would be highly organised.  
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
26.  When I look at a piece of furniture, I do 
not notice the details of how it was 
constructed.  
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
27.  The idea of engaging in "risk-taking" 
activities appeals to me.  
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
28. When I learn about historical events, I 
do not focus on exact dates.  
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
29. When I read the newspaper, I am 
drawn to tables of information, such as 
football league scores or stock market 
indices.  
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
30. When I learn a language, I become 
intrigued by its grammatical rules.  
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
31. I find it difficult to learn my way around 
a new city.  
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
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32. I do not tend to watch science 
documentaries on television or read 
articles about science and nature.  
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
33. If I were buying a stereo, I would want 
to know about its precise technical 
features.  
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
34. I find it easy to grasp exactly how odds 
work in betting.  
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
35. I am not very meticulous when I carry 
out D.I.Y.  
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
36. I find it easy to carry on a conversation 
with someone I've just met.  
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
37. When I look at a building, I am curious 
about the precise way it was 
constructed.  
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
38. When an election is being held, I am 
not interested in the results for each 
constituency.  
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
39. When I lend someone money, I expect 
them to pay me back exactly what they 
owe me.  
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
40. I find it difficult to understand 
information the bank sends me on 
different investment and saving 
systems.  
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
41. When travelling by train, I often wonder 
exactly how the rail networks are 
coordinated.  
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
42. When I buy a new appliance, I do not 
read the instruction manual very 
thoroughly.  
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
43. If I were buying a camera, I would not 
look carefully into the quality of the lens.  
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
44. When I read something, I always notice 
whether it is grammatically correct.  
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
45. When I hear the weather forecast, I am 
not very interested in the meteorological 
patterns.  
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
46. I often wonder what it would be like to 
be someone else.  
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
47. I find it difficult to do two things at once.  strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
48. When I look at a mountain, I think 
about how precisely it was formed.  
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
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49. I can easily visualise how the 
motorways in my region link up.  
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
50.  When I'm in a restaurant, I often have 
a hard time deciding what to order 
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
51.  When I'm in a plane, I do not think 
about the aerodynamics 
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
52.  I often forget the precise details of 
conversations I've had 
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
53.  When I am walking in the country, I am 
curious about how the various kinds of 
trees differ 
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
54.  After meeting someone just once or 
twice, I find it difficult to remember 
precisely what they look like 
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
55.  I am interested in knowing the path a 
river takes from its source to the sea 
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
56.  I do not read legal documents very 
carefully 
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
57.  I am not interested in understanding 
how wireless communication works 
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
58. I am curious about life on other planets strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
59. When I travel, I like to learn specific 
details about the culture of the place I 
am visiting 
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
60. I do not care to know the names of the 
plants I see 
strongly 
agree 
slightly 
agree 
slightly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
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APPENDIX C: THE QUESTIONS ASKED OF THE PARTICIPANTS 
 
What kind of phone do you have and how often do you use it? 
What do you use the phone for other than calling? 
What happens if you enter the wrong pin number to switch on the phone? 
What is in the telephone? 
What is in the SIM card? 
How is the information used?  
Do you know what the PIN code does? 
How do you think the telephone works? 
Is there a difference between messaging & email? 
What happens to the ‘phone during the connection? 
Why does the battery go flat when you don't use the phone? 
What does the signal availability mean? 
What does it mean when the network is busy? 
What makes the battery life go down fastest? 
What do the bars on the phone mean? 
 
 
 
